WPCS  6ǃӌlas[KS!x ŒL/& W; E6hxE "8^q<}_asY9pcXU;O-Dͦ4tHE&#l񣗓zW5 _vXsV8c*r~j}eqdE uЃ)W< LX2GvyG)+=yw;.=`DPΛrt)ȓbPp$p Jaʖc>Єnǿxզʈ^>`?8yii!}hfڽmcF:s-u_E {/btoBhzḣx|X6t/A0ua> T2g臄]5,,~ɥsaU0A#!U% : % 0(w@4Wkz m|f 0eY6 0g b : b?  Y 0 e O 0^eJ   } fCaEfYa[ 0@ofafa 1m 0cHqM7; 0gU">h 0Df B  D+  0K4af 0 Ba 0D/ A/ 0 D AQ2 0DI D/ BfafUNa?HP LaserJet 1200 Series PCL 60rAZ"Arial RegularX($ <<==8=[==D=U==3s-:i+003|x=lU1, 2, 3,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#)N2Quick 1.   .0  a, b, c,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 56#)4Quick a.    .0  Page of & 0# Xd#  Page of &I., II.,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#+F2Quick I.  .0 A, B,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#+2Quick A.  .0  Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5TABLE A8!TABLE B2c0Quick 220 @TABLE CYTABLE D# e37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;$2 e  0  .3  0  Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5i., ii., iii.,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 56#.^4Quick i. &  .0 &۴l9Z+&Courier Regular(3$ !  ,= d'dxd( $ Figure  1  TABLE C4@c$`Diamond`0 TABLE D(3$ !  )-,&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK6b$Triangle0   82)9:C<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ;;' dxdP PdTABLE A9x@ Z6Times New Roman RegularTABLE D !  ݛ=kXX==<XX&<=<<XX<<<XX&<(vkX8~XXdd8  AdministrativeLawOutlineVermeuleFall2002    NOTE:COC=canonofconstruction6" X'" [XX6= =+F  +F]I  .0 '   THEUNEASYCONSTITUTIONALPOSITIONOFTHEADMINISTRATIVEAGENCY= =:=Think  aboutthesetwoviews:=+F]xی'(#'(# Ќ  5b   ' 5b0    PESSIMIST:TheCrthasallowedsuccessive,largescaledepartures  fromtheconstitutionalsettlementunderintensepressurefrompowerfulpoliticalforcesandperceivedpracticalnecessities=5b݌ (#(# Ќ  =5b݌ (#(# Ќ  5b   ' 5bG0    OPTIMIST:TheCourthaskeptbasicfaithwithconstitutional   principlesunderallthreearticles,byusinginterpretivetechniquesthatallowCongress,thePres,andthefedjudtoretainthemostessentialpartsoftheiroriginalconstitutionalauthorityunderdramaticallychangedconditions.5bGn݌ (#(# Ќ  +   ' +A  .0    IntroductoryMaterial(pp.335)+9ی# (#(# Ќ   )N   '    )N 1  .0   Whatisadministrativelaw?(3) )N, ی  (# (# Ќ   ' legalcontrolofgovernment ' legalprinciplesthatdefinetheauthorityandstructureofadminagencies,specifytheproceduralformalitiesthatagenciesuse,determinevalidityofadmindecisions,andoutlinetheroleofreviewingcrtsandotherorgansofgovernmentintheirrelationtoadministrativeagencies.0 ' addressesrelationshipb/ncitizensandgovernment,notcitizentocitizen '(#'(#  ' includesthreebasicbodiesoflaw ' (1)0  constitutionallaw!(#(#  ' (2)0  statutorylaw,espAdministrativeProcedureAct(APA):compromiseb/n  ТNDersandcommonlawmorejudicialreview,sepofpowersatagencylevel,etc. (#(#  ' (3)0  formoffedcommonlaw(#(# THEMEINCOURSE:importanceofsubstantiveresponsibilitiesofparticularagenciesandmeansavailabletothemincarryingouttheirgoals(4) )N   '    )N  2  .0   ProblemsAddressedbyAdministrativeLaw )N %  ی (# (# Ќ   '    a.0 " Problemsotherinstitutionsnotaddressingadequately" (#" (#   )   '     )ސ b  .0 "   Marketfailures )ސ یgl " (#" (# Ќ  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#controlmonopolypower(economicandsocial/political) " (#" (#  '     " toobtain allocativeefficiency(5) '     " economicobjectives '     "  fairerincomedistribution '     "  avoidingdiscrimination )   '     )k c  .0 "   CommonlawNewDealers,antiDiceansfeltcommonlawjust & anotherregulatorsystem;dysfunctional,fixitwithadminagencies )k ی " (#" (# Ќ   '     " commonlawbasedongeneralists '     " admin:experts,specialization '     " legalremediesmaybetoo$$ )   '     ) d  .0 "   NewDealersdidntliketoomuchseparationofpowers #, preferredefficiencyofagencieslowertransactioncosts )  ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )+ e  .0 "   lackofsocial/positiverights )+j ی1%6 ." (#" (# Ќ   '     " ND: secondbillofrightseconomic0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#60sand70s:civilrights,environment,consumers,safety,etc. " (#" (#  '   0 f.0" (# (#Inadequateinformation(e.g.,safety,complexity)'#2" (#" (#  )   '     )޶ f  .0 "   avoidfreeriderproblem )޶ ی(#3" (#" (# Ќ   )  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(# )ޭ g  .0" (# (#  heuristicdevicesmaydistortreality,esprisks/dangers c)h$4 cognitivedissonance )ޭ ی " (#" (# Ќ   )  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(# ) h  .0" (# (#  Collectiveactionproblems(7) )R ی*%6" (#" (# Ќ  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(# " public,collectivegoodse.g.,nationaldefense  (# (#  '     " nonrivalrous,nonexcludable /,4'8 X 8~XXdXXd8    )   '     )ކ i  .0 "   LessSecureEconomicGrounds(8) )ކ  ی" (#" (# Ќ   0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(# " control windfallprofits  (# (#  '     " eliminate excessivecompetition '     " subsidyprograms '     " predatorypricing0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#protectindustrieswithlargefixedcostsandcyclicaldemand " (#" (#  '     " alleviatescarcity )   '     ) j  .0 "   dealwithagencyproblems   )   ی " (#" (# Ќ    )N   '    )N  3  .0    ClassicRegulatoryTools(13)(SEECHARTonp.15) )N 1! یF K  (# (# Ќ   '      costofserviceratemaking(e.g.,trucking,naturalgasproduction,hospitals)0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#allocationinaccordancewithpublicintereststandard(e.g.,television) " (#" (#  '     " standardsetting(OSHA)0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#historicallybasedpricesetting,orallocation(e.g.,nationalpricecontrols " (#" (#  '     " screeningorlicensing(drugregulation) '     " feesortaxes '     " provisionofinformation(SEC,OSHA,etc.) '     " subsidies(agriculture)0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#noncoerciveeffortstoproducecooperationthroughmoralsuasion/politicalincentives " (#" (#   )N   '    )Nl& 4  .0   Commoncharacteristicsofregulatoryschemes:(14) )Nl&& ی (# (# Ќ   )   '     )q' a  .0 "   regulatorandregulatedindustrieshaveadversarial  relationship )q'' ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )ޜ( b  .0 "   regulatorisinstitutionalbureaucracyoperatedby ). administratorsorcivilservantswhomayprefertodesignrulesthatareeasytoadminister )ޜ(( ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )* c  .0 "   newregulatoryprogramsusuallycopyoldones )*T* یBG" (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )!+ d  .0 "   regdecisionsaresubjecttorequirementsofadminlaw,  usuallyAPA;mustbejustifiabletocourtoflawi.e.,rationalandfairprocedures )!+`+ ی " (#" (# Ќ   )N   '    )N, 5  .0   TraditionalModelofAdminLaw:reflectsjudicialdistrustof ! adminagencies,anddistrustofadminagenciesascomparedtomarketplace )N,, ی  (# (# Ќ    )   '     ). a  .0 "   Thelegislaturemustauthorizeadminsanctionsonprivate ',$ personsthroughrulesorstandardsthatlimitagencydiscretion. ).Z. ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )ހ/ b  .0 "    Theproceduresusedbytheagencymusttendtoensureagency @ E' compliancewithlegislativedirectives.(20) )ހ// ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )0 c  .0 "   Judicialreviewmustbeavailabletoensurethatagenciesuse !) accurateandimpartialdecisionmakingproceduresandcomplywithlegislativedirectives. )0/1 ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )r2 d  .0 "   Agencyprocessesmustfacilitatetheexerciseofjudicial #, review. [    )r22 یr$w-" (#" (# Ќ    )N   '    )N3 6  .0   Criticismsofadminprocess:   p  )N3 4 ی%%* . (# (# Ќ    )   '     )4 a  .0 "   Nader,consumeradvocates:agencies captured )4<5 ی% /" (#" (# Ќ  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#desireforgreaterpublicopennessinagencydecisionmaking " (#" (#  '     " morestatutorydeadlinesor hammers '     " greaterparticipationbypublicinterestadvocates '     " moreformaldecisionmakingprocedures '     " stricterjudicialscrutiny '     " closercongressionalscrutinyofagencypolicies '     " eliminationofconflictsofinterest0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#elimination/modificationofprogramsthatprimarily #,('8 benefittedregulatedfirms " (#" (#  )   '     )ޔ9 b  .0 "   welfare/publicservicestate )ޔ99 ی" (#" (# Ќ   '     " moreproceduralprotectionforbeneficiaries(27) '     " newproperty0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#trialtypehearings,proceduralformalities,judicialreview " (#" (#  )   '     ); c  .0 "   critiqueofeconomists,seeking );< ی- 2" (#" (# Ќ   '     " deregulation0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#greaterattentiontocostandunintendedharmfulconsequencesofregs " (#" (#  '     " consolidationofprograms '     " cost/benefitanalysis0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#increaseduseofeconomicincentivesinlieuof commandandcontrol(28)   " (#" (#  )N   '    )N? 7  .0   Responsesofcourtstoconcerns: p    )N?G? ی  (# (# Ќ    )   '     );@ a  .0 "   extendedrighttoparticipateinagencydecisionsandtoseek x}  judicialreviewtowelfarerecipients,etc.thoseaffected;ineffect,changingpurposefromlimitinggovernmentpowertoprotectprivateinterestsrepresentingrelevantinterests );@z@ ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )'B b  .0 "   extendedcoverage/contentofproceduralformalitiesso DI  actionstakenmorefullydocumentedwithfactualrecord )'BfB ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )ހC c  .0 "   expandedavailabilityofjudicialreview   )ހCC ی" (#" (# Ќ   )N   '    )ND 8  .0   Congressionalresponse:(30)   p  )NDD ی]b (# (# Ќ    )   '     )޶E a  .0 "   deregulationofsomeindustries,e.g.,airline )޶EE ی" (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )F b  .0 "   liberalizedeconomicregulationoftruckingandrailroads )FG ی" (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )G c  .0 "   abolishedprice/entryregulationforlongdistance v{ telecommunications )GH ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     ) I d  .0 "   abolishedregofnaturalgasproduction,etc. ) IJI ی" (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )J e  .0 "   renewedemphasisonmarketorderingpursuanttocommonlaw )JVJ ی" (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )0K f  .0 "   reinvigorationofstateasopposedtonatlauthority )0KoK یBG" (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )EL g  .0 "   decreasedenthusiasmforregulatordiscretioninpolicy  making )ELL ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )nM h  .0 "   emphasisoncost/benefitanalysis )nMM ی[` " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )nN i  .0 "   shiftfrompriceandentrycontrolstoenvironment,health, ! safetyregs   p    )nNN  ی"" (#" (# Ќ   )N   '    )NO 9  .0   Currentstatus )NOO  یty# (# (# Ќ     )   '     )P a  .0 "   quantitativeanalysislookatmagnitudeofproblems,not ',$ justexistence )PQ ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )Q b  .0 "   assesstradeoffsconsidercostsandunintendedsideeffects )Q'C"1(#(# Ќ    '"2 *w+ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#w,xdd +    ТNondelegationRules1.0  Congresscantdelegatewhatitdoesnthave:onlyhasenumeratedpowers  +necessaryandproper(Art.I,1) ""    )N   )N% ی  (# (# Ќ  commission;3fedjudges,3academics,andoneprisonwardenappointedbypres,confirmedbySenate.Majorityof8citedHampton,saidthiswasokay, c h  standards.ISSUE:whethercreationofFederalSentencingCommissionwasunconstitutionaldelegationofpower.Crtsaidokay,detailedstandards.Discussionofseparationofpowers:separate,butflexible;concernisencroachment/aggrandizement.STANDARDOFREVIEW:should invalidatestatutepassedbybothHousesofCongressandsignedbyPresident,particularlyanact...thatconfrontsadeeplyvexingnationalproblem,..onlyforthemostcompellingconstitutionalreasons(111)HERE,Commissionwithinjudicialbranch,carryingoutarejudicial,notlegislativeorexecutiveokaytogiverulemakingauthoritytoJudicialBranchandPresremovalpowerokaywouldstillbelifetimejudges;doesntdiminishstatusofAtIIIJudges(112): CongressneitherdelegatedexcessivelegislativepowernorupsettheconstitutionallymandatedbalanceofpowersamongthecoordinateBranches(113).NeitherConstitutions structuralprotectionsnor oursystemofcheckedandbalancedauthorityprohibitthis.(113) )N   '  )N+ 7  .0    Morrisonv.Olson,487U.S.654(1988)(JUSTICEREHNQUIST)(115):  Independentcounsel )N+F+ ی (#(# Ќ  couldbeappointedbyacrttoinvestigatecrimeandprosecutehighlevelpoliticalofficials.CanberemovedbyPresonlyfor goodcause.Crtupheldτexistenceofindependentcounselwouldnotpreventthepresidentfromexercisinghisconstitutionallyspecifiedfunction.Notentirelyindependent,however,becausecouldbefiredfor goodcause.REASONING:̄Text/structure:Art.II,2,cl.2:appellantis inferiorofficer;CongcanplaceapptpowerinPresalone,ORincrtsoflaw,ORinheadsofdept.Canauthorizeinterbranchappointments(powernotunlimited,mustnotcompromiseseparationofpowersorimpairconstitutionalfunctionofoneofthebranches).Removalprocessdoesnt poseasuffthreatofjudicialintrusionintoexecutiverealmtojustifyoverturning.̄separationofpowers:UnlikeBowsherandMyers,thiscaseisntabout z$- Congresstryingtotakepoweronitselftoremove;butputsremovalinhandsofexecutivebranch(byAG,forcause).Decisionsubjecttojudicialreview.LikeHEandWiener,forcauseremoval:doesntimpedePresabilityto &!0 performhisconstitutionalduty.̄independentcounselhasgreatdealofdiscretion,but wedonotseehowthePresneedtocontroltheexerciseofthatdiscretionissocentraltothefunctioningoftheExecutiveBranchthatthecounsel[should]beterminableatwillbythePresBOTTOMLINE: WedonotthinkthatthislimitationasitpresentlystandssufficientlydeprivesthePresofcontrolovertheIndependentcounseltointerfereimpermissiblywithhisconstitutionalobligationtoensurethe /,4'8 faithfulexecutionofthelaws(391) SCALIADISSENT:separationofpowers:ProsecutionispurelyexecutivefunctionandthereforeCongresscouldntcreatethisasindependentagency.ThisallowedCongresstoinsulateanexecutiveofficerfrompresidentialcontrol.(115)VERM:clearbythispointthatsweepingrationaleofMyersisnolongergood z law;notthecasethatPreshasunfettereddiscretiontoremoveatwillanyexecutivebranchofficer.Leavestradeoffsituation:Congcancreatenewagencies,butsomeoneelsehastostaffthem.  ' 8.0  MWAAv.CitizensfortheAbatementofAirportNoise,501U.S.252 H M  (1992)(116).STATUTE (#(# calledforBrdofReviewtovetoMWAAdecisions;consistedof9membersofCongressselectedbyCongressfromdesignatedcommitteeswithoversightforaviation.CRTHELDboardunconstitutional encroachmentbyCongress̄ifwereexecutiveinfunctioning,theninvalidbyBowsher   Єifwerelegislative,invalidbyChadha ~     )N   '  )N7 9  .0    Howtoreconcile:Myers,HumphreysExecutor,Weiner,Bowsher, 38  Morrison,andMistretta:a.   آCrtwillupholdlegdelegatingpower   toabranchprovided )N77  ی (#(# Ќ  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#thepowerisatleastarguablyrelatedtothebasicfunctionofthatbranch  (# (#  '    specifictextofConstitutiondoesntforbidthedelegation0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#delegationdoesntnotunreasonablyinterferewiththeabilityofadiffbranchtocarryoutitsconstitutionallymandatedduties  (# (#   )   '    )j; b  .0   ݢCrthassaidthatindependenceisacceptablebutencroachmentand ~ aggrandizementarenot.(11718) )j;; ی  (# (# Ќ   '   +   ' +<H  .0    Congress,ThePresident,andtheAdministration:Presidential  DirectionofAgencies+<<ی (#(# Ќ   '    )N   '    )N> 1  .0   Definitionofindependentagencies:ConghaslimitedPres  abilitytoremovetheirleaders )N>H> ی  (# (# Ќ   )N   '    )NS? 2  .0   Howmuchcontroldoeshehave?SeeHYPOson114115. )NS?? ی! (# (# Ќ    )  0 ' 0'(#'(#  )w@ a  .0" (#(#  limitedpowertodictatepolicytothem )w@@ ی"" (#" (# Ќ   )  0 ' 0'(#'(#  )ލA b  .0" (#(#  practicalpower )ލAA ی|#" (#" (# Ќ  0 ' 0'(#'(#  " canoftendeterminewhochairmanis (#(#  '     " canoftenfillvacancies '     " interveneviaJusticeDept '     " influenceviews0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#introducesubstantivelegislationandreorganizegovernment(120) [ !)" (#" (#  )N   '    )ND 3  .0   ExampleofPresidentialDirection:PresidentClintonsRegulatory a"f* PlanningandReviewExecutiveOrder,19Admin.L.News89(Winter1994)(133)NOTE:theseareproceduralcontrols )NDD ی#, (# (# Ќ    )   '     )OF a  .0 "   changesfromReagansorderalthoughverysimilarinalot |$- ofways )OFF ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )ށG b  .0 "   promulgateregswhennecessary,consideringcost,benefitsof % / alternatives,includingnonreg )ށGG ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )H c  .0 "   maximizenebenefitstosocietyunlessalawrequires H'M"1 otherwise )HI ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )I d  .0 "   defineregs:ruleswiththeforceandeffectoflaw,not (#3 interprules,policystatements )I2J ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )6K e  .0 "   majorrule:annualeffectoneconomyof$100millionormore )6KuK ی*%5" (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )QL f  .0 "   ݢOIRAOfficeofInformationandRegulatoryActivities *%6 clearinghouse,coordination )QLL ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )ޔM g  .0 "   RegulatoryWorkingGrouprepsofagencies,VP,presidential -,2'8 advisors,chairedbyOIRAAdmin )ޔMM ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )N h  .0 "   unifiedregulatoryagency,annualplanonwhichVPmayadvise  andconsult )NO ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )P i  .0 "   review,eliminateexistingregsifdontmeetrequired  principles )PQP  ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )AQ j  .0 "   reductionoflobbyingonlyadminofOIRAordesigneecan z receiveoralcommunicationsfrompersonsoutsideexecutivebranch,andnomeetingwithoutsidepersonscantakeplacewithoutinvitingarepfromtheaffectedagency(134)informationtobemadeavailabletopublicaboutsuchmeetings )AQQ  ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )US k  .0 "   consider qualitativecostsandbenefits,aswellasthose    thatcanbequantified(135) )USS  ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )ޞT l  .0 "   consideralsodistributionalimpactandequity )ޞTT  ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )ޫU m  .0 "   seekviewsofstate,local,tribalofficialsfirstbefore   imposingrulesonthem )ޫUU  ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )V n  .0 "   encouragesagenciestoaskwhethertheproblemaddressedis +0  itselfcausedbyexistingreg )V%W ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )*X o  .0 "   identifyalternativestodirectreg,includingprovisionof   infoandeconomicincentives )*XiX ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )mY p  .0 "   useperformancestandardsinsteadofdesignstandards )mYY ی " (#" (# Ќ   )N   '    )NZ 4  .0   Substantivecontrol?   p  )NZZ ی (# (# Ќ    )   '     )ޜ[ a  .0 "   Notofindependentagencies,althoughnoSCcaseactually ]b saysthat )ޜ[[ ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )\ b  .0 "   ExecutiveagenciesseeMyers(90)cantoverturnactions,  butcanremovefromoffice:VERM:evenstrongestunitariansacceptthattherearesomedecisionsbynonindependentofficersthatPrescantcountermand:themoreadjudicativeitlooks,themorelikelycrttosaythat.MakesPresreluctanttotellthemtochangecasesthataffectindividuals. )\ ] ی " (#" (# Ќ  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#problem:Prescanremove,butcanhidebehind  constitutionalruletoescaperesponsibilityforofficialsconducthewinseitherway " (#" (# VERM:Preshasproceduralpowersasseenabovetomakeagenciesjumpthroughhoops,butlackssubstantivepowerstocountermandindependentagenciesanddepartmentsiftheyareexercisingjudicialkindsofpower(CHECKTHISWITHSAPNAunclear)+F    ' +F=aI  .0    AgenciesandArticleIIICourts(14464)+F=aaیB G'(#(# Ќ    )N   '    )Ndb 1  .0   Areagencieswithimportantadjudicativefunctionsconstitutional  ( "i.e.,nonArt.IIICrts?   p  )Ndbb ی!) (# (# Ќ    )  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(# )c a  .0" (# (#  Constitutionaltext:Art.III,1: Thejudicialpowerof ["`* theU.S.shallbevestedinoneSCandinsuchinferiorcrtsastheCongmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish.Thejudges...shallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehavior,andshall,atstatetimes,receivefortheirservices,acompensationwhichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice.   )c/d ی&!0" (#" (# Ќ   )  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(# )~f b  .0" (# (#  ButArt.IIIcourtsnotonlyinstitutionsdecidingquestions @'E"1 offedlaw )~ff ی " (#" (# Ќ  0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(# " legislature,beforepassingprivatebills  (# (# 0 ' 0'(#'(#0 (#(#0" (# (#executive:e.g.,IRS,decidingwhetheryoufollowedlawinfilingtaxreturn " (#" (#  '     " statecourts   *%6  )   '     )Xi c  .0 "   Creationofinferiorcrtslefttodiscretionofleg: r+w&7 baselinecouldhavestatecrtsadjudicatingmattersoffed %,*'8 law,withappealtoSC )Xii ی " (#" (# Ќ   )   '     )j d  .0 "   THEISSUE:GiventhatArt.IIIcourtsdonthavetohear  everything,whatkindsofoversightisrequiredfornonArt.IIIadjudicatorybodies?Or,morenarrowly:TowhatextentmayinitialdecisionsonquestionoffedlawinnonArt.IIItribunalbemadeimmunefromdenovoreviewbyArt.IIItribunal? )j(k ی " (#" (# Ќ   '     " alwaysdenovoonFACTSandLAWappeal?NO.  '   2.0 Crowellv.Benson, 285U.S.22(1932)(144)  (# (#  ' (HUGHES).STATUTE:LongshoremanandHarborWorkersCompensationActCongressdelegatestodeputycommissionerfactfindingauthority.CommissionerCrowellfoundthatinjuredworkerKnudsen,wasemployeeofBensonandwasinjuredperformingserviceuponthenavigablewatersoftheU.S.ActionbroughttoenjoinenforcementofawardmadeinKnudsensbehalfagainstBensonongroundsthatKnudsenwasnotemployedbyBensonattimeofinjury.ISSUES:whetherthisviolateddueprocessclauseHOLDINGNO.whetherthestateunconstitutionallybestowsjudicialpoweruponanonjudicialbody(145)HOLDING:Dstcrtdidnoterrinpermittingatrialdenovoontheissueofemployment(148)REASONING(formalist):̄judicialpowerofUSvestedinArticleIIICourts̄underMurraysLessee(1856)(145):Congresscanneitherwithdrawfrom  judicialcognizancematterwhichissubjectofatcommonlaw,equity,admiralty;NORbringinanothermatternotasubjectofjudicialdetermination  $ 6OYфtwokindsofcaseswithrespecttodeterminationoffact:*U+ddxdd + (#(#U,<dd ,<dd +    CASESINVOLVINGPRIVATERIGHTS   CASESINVOLVINGPUBLICRIGHTS   0@c  0@cs`0    Crowellv.Benson(1932)(144)0@css݌Y^ Ќ  0@c  0@c8t`0    notalldeterminationsoffact   mustbemadebyjudges0@c8tSt݌  Ќ  0@c  ݀0@cu`0    havealsoasfactfinders:juries, r w masters/commissionersinadmiralty"oftenadvisory,NOrightofpartiestodemandthatϢcrtredeterminethem0@cu!u݌  Ќ  0@c  ݀0@c3v`0    looknottoform,butsubstance0@c3vOv݌   Ќ  ݀limitedapplicatioǹnecessarytoeffectiveenforcement̀efficient(1000sofcases)̀crtsstillretaincompleteauthoritytoinsureproperapplicationofthelaẁBUT(147)doesntmeanNOLIMITS0@c  0@cw`0    cantvestallfactfinding  elsewhere0@cwx݌  Ќ  0@c  0@cx`0    requirementsdifferentiffactis UZ conditionprecedenttooperationofstatutoryscheme)(heremaster/emprelationshiporwhetheronwaterways)0@cxx݌  Ќ  0@c  0@cy`0    Itisthequestionwhether  Congressmaysubstituteforconstitutionalcourts<  ԍ<=  ԍ=anadministrativeagencyforthefinaldeterminationoftheexistenceoffactsuponwhichtheenforcementofconstitutionalrightsofcitizendepend.==<<0@cyy<<==  Ќ==<<  0@c  0@c{<<==`0  ==<<  <<==ifallowedadminagencytodo lq% this,wouldbureaucratic $& government,sapjudicialpower==<<0@c{{<<==  Ќ==<<  0@c  0@cL}<<==`0  ==<<  <<==whereconstitutionalrightsat  ( stake,judicialpoweroftheUSentailsindependentdeterminationofbothfactandlaw==<<0@cL}g}<<==  Ќ==<<  0@c  0@c~<<==`0  ==<<  <<==e.g.,confiscation(OhioValley Q#V, Water,1920);aliendeportation(==<<<<==Ng==<<<<==FungHo,1922)==<<0@c~~====<<<  <=  = $. Ќ  0@c  0@cˀ`0    MurraysLesses(1856)(145): Y^/ ТCongmayormaynotbringintocognizanceofU.S.courts0@cˀ݌ "" Ќ  0@c  0@c`0    mayestablish legislative r w2 courts(forterritories,D.C.,specialtribunals)toexaminematterswhichfromtheirnaturedonotrequirejudicialdetermination,butareyetsusceptibleofit0@cہ݌ "" Ќ  0@c  0@c`0    determinationsinthisclassare W\ 9 uptoCongress;maydelegatetoexecutiveofficersORjudicialtribunals.(seetopof146forexamples)0@c6݌##( =""  #Ќ  THISCASE:Crtheldstatuteconstitutionalbyconstruingittoallowfederalcourttodeterminetheexistenceofthesefundamentalfactsonitsownrecordandfactselicitedbeforeit.DISSENT(functional):Brandeis:Framesquestion/issuedifferently:Uponwhatrecordshallthedstcrtsreviewoftheorderofthedeputycommissionerbebased?(148).Iftotallynewhearingduplication,delay. )$B NothinginConstitutionpreventsassignmentoffactfindingtoadminagencies,eveniffactsarelabeled constitutionalor jurisdictional,includingexclusivepowertodoso.Factfindingshouldbesubsumedunderstatutoryscheme.(149) +&F Effective/efficient;safeguardsinplace.Conclusions(law)opentoreviewbylawcrts.IFthereisanycontroversythatcantbesubmittedtoadminbodyorϢfedlegcourts,itsbecauseundercertaincircumstancesconstitutionalguaranteeofdueprocessisarequirementofjudicialprocessNOTbecauseofanyprohibitionagainstdiminutionofjurisdictionoffeddstcrtsassuch(150).Badoutcomehere.Impractical.NOTES:SummaryafterCrowelloflawgoverningrelationshipb/nArt.IIIcrtsandadministrativestate: CongressispermittedtodelegateadjudicatoryfunctionstoanadminagencyIFANDONLYIFthereisjudicialreviewtoensurethattheagencyhasfollowedthelawandfoundthefactsinareasonablemanner.0    (#(# VERM:concerndifb/nArt.IIIjudgesandagencyadmin:lifetenure,salaryprotectionimmunefrompoliticalpressure?Butadminjudgesmayhavesome _ d  protectione.g.,CivilService.BLACKLETTERLAWOFCROWELL:̄allpublicrightscasesCongcandelegatetononArt.IIItribunal̄privaterightscases: ' FACTS: '   ifjurisdictional/constitutionaldenovoreviewbyArticleIII   Тcrt0 ' 0'(#'(#otherfactsdeferencetoadmintribunal(decisionmustbesupportedbyevidence;ifso,ArticleIIIcrtwillupholdfactualdetermination;dontreconsiderallevidence,butaskifadmindecisionreasonable (#(#  ' LAW:denovoreviewbyArticleIIIcrts̄distinctionb/nconstitutional/jurisfactsandother: nonsensical ' disregardideaofjurisdictionalfacts:deadlettertoday0 ' constitutionalfacts:maybevalidinacoupleofsettings:e.g.,inFirstAmendmentcases,rightsmayturnondeterminationofcertainfacts '(#'(# REALSIGNIFICANCEOFCROWELL:deference:allowsnonArticleIIIagenciestoadjudicatealotofissueswithonlydeferentialreview.(Thatseventruewithrespecttolegalquestions,whichCrowelldoesntallow.    )N   '    )N 3  .0    FedRadioCommissionv.GE(1930)(151):CrtheldthatCongmay ]b  notgrantacourtthe )Nߏ ی  (# (# Ќ  powertoawardaradiolicensebecauseawardinglicensesisanadminfunction,notjudicialArt.IIIdoesntauthorizecrtstodothat.Suggeststhatconstitutionalseparationofpowersprinciplessometimesforbiddenovoconsiderationbyacrtofnonjudicialadminagencyactivities(151).Whatarethose?activitiesthat bearlittleanalogytohistoricaljudicialfunctions(151)VERM:didntdiscussatall. )N   '    )N 4  .0   NorthernPipelineConstructionCo.v.MarathonPipeLineCo. !) (1982)(JUSTICE )N ی  (# (# Ќ  BRENNAN)formalseparationofpowerspositionherethatwouldtendtorestrictCongressabilitytodelegateadjudicatorypowersevenmorethanCrowelldid.(152)NOTE:Thisispluralitydecision,undoneinSchor,belowV: x$}- triedtoarticulateframeworkthatwouldseverelyconstrictCrowell. -%2 . FACTS:BankruptcyjudgesnotArt.IIIbecauseneitherenjoylifetenurenorconstitutionallyprotectedsalary.ISSUE:whetherCongcouldgivethemthebroadlegalpowertohearanddecidealllegalcontroversies arisinginorrelatedtobankruptcyproceedings,i.e.,allrelatedcivilproceedings.(152)ORISSUEMORESPECIFICALLY:CouldCongressconstitutionallydelegatetobankruptcyjudgethelegalpowertodecideanordinarystatelawcontractclaimthatonepartyfiledagainstanotherinmidstofbankruptcyreorganization?NO,saysplurality,eventhoughwouldbeadministrativelyusefultodoso -,2'8 BUTREASONING,BRENNAN,FORMAL:̄ConstitutionforbidsCongresstodothis,evenwithArt.IIIjudgesreviewingitonappeal.PrecedentallowsdelegationofadjudicatorypowertononArt.IIIjudgesinonlythreecases:territorialcourts,courtsmartial,legislativecourtsandadminagenciesthepowertoadjudicatecasesinvolvingpublicrightsV: breathtakinglyStalinistrewritingofhistory.Sincegovernmentneednothavecreatedpublicrightsatall,canresolvetheminadminorlegcourts,assumingmeetsdueprocessstandards(153)̄BUTthiscontractclaimisnotpublicright,butprivaterightliabilityofoneprivatepartyagainstanother.Statute impermissiblyremovedmost,ifnotall,oftheessentialattributesofthejudicialpowerfromArt.IIIϢcrtsandvestedtheminnonart.IIIbankruptcycourts.Thus,CongcouldnotpermitanonArt.IIIjudgetoadjudicatetheclaim.0    _ d (#(# ЄdistinguishesthiscasefromCrowell:dividesprivaterightsintotwo   categories(153)*f+dd<dd <dd +(#(#f,<dd ,<dd +   -2  PRIVATERIGHTSCREATEDBYCONGRESS    PRIVATERIGHTSCREATEDOTHERWISEe.g.,bycommonlaw,statelaw,etc.  DI   Congresspossessessubstantialdiscretiontoprescribethemannerinwhichthatrightmaybeadjudicated0@c  0@cٝ`0    canassigntoadjunctofsome  functionshistoricallyperformedbythejudge(whateverthatmeans)0@cٝ݌  Ќ  0@c  0@cҞ`0    cancreatepresumptionsorassign pu burdensofproof0@cҞ݌  Ќ  0@c  0@c`0    cancreateparticularized  tribunalstohearthem0@c݌  Ќ  Art.IIIforbids substantialinroadsintofunctionsthathavetraditionallybeenperformedbythejudiciary(153)VERM:reallystupidherethesearenottherightyoumostwanttoprotectfromencroachment;butfederalconstitutional/statutoryrights!Brennangotitbackward! (  Єotherdistinctionsb/nCrowellandthiscase: lq( 0 ' inCrowell,agencymadeonlyspecialized,narrowlyconfinedfactual !&) determinations;inbankruptcycrt,makesallrelevantfindingsoffactinmanyareasofthelaw '(#'(# 0 ' inCrowell,agencyhadtoseekcrtenforcementofitsorders;bankruptcy <A, Тcrtenforcesitsownorders '(#'(# 0 ' ordersissuedinCrowellbyagencysetasidein notsupportedbythe . evidence;here,onlyundermoredeferential clearlyerroneousstandard(153) '(#'(#  ' Crowellinvolves:privaterightcreatedbyCongress,greaterArt.IIIparticipationandsupervisionCONCURINJUDGMENT:REHNandOConnor̄contractclaimwassotraditionallyjudicialthatcouldntbeassignedtononjudicialbodytoresolve(154)DISSENTbyWhite,Powell,andBurger(CJ):(functional)̄separationofpowers:appellatereviewandlikelynonpoliticalnatureofclaimsmeansconcernsmet̄appellatereviewuniformity,conformitytolaw W&\!9 Єnonpoliticalnatureofclaimsnoundueexecutiveorleginfluencein  '": outcomesoraggrandizement̄therefore,delegationallowed.   p    p(u#<  )N   '    )N' 5  .0   CFTCv.Schor,478U.S.833(1986)(154)(JUSTICEOConnor) )N'Z ی#)($= (# (# Ќ  ISSUEsimilartothatinMarathon:CanCongressconstitutionallygranttoCFTCthepowertoadjudicateordinarystatelawcontractclaimsb/ntwoindividuals?V:inthiscase,getitjustaboutrightfunctional:goodreasonsfornonArt.IIIcourts:expertise,geog,subcultures. +&A FACTS:Context: reparationsproceeding,wheredisgruntledcustomerofbrokercouldseemdamagesforviolationofact.Proceedingbeforeagency,whichadjudicates(154).Customerhaschoiceofagencyorclaiminfedcourt.Ifusesagency,anyrelatedstatelawcounterclaimbrokerbrings,agencyalsohearsthat.OUTCOME:repudiatesMarathonplurality.REASONING:̄cantjustrelyon conclusoryreferencetolanguageofArt.III;mustlooktopurposesunderlyingArt.IIIrequirements:use practicalattentiontosubstanceratherthandoctrinairerelianceonformalcategories(Brennan,youdummy.)PURPOSESofART.III:toprotectroleofindependentjudiciarywithinconstitutionalscheme(tripartite)(155)ANDsafeguardslitigantswithjudgesfreefromdominationbyotherbranches.INTHISCASE:CFTCsadjudicatorypowersliketraditionalagencymodelexceptτinitsjurisdictionovercommonlawcounterclaims̄dealsonlywithparticularizedareaoflaw(notlikebankruptcy,butlikeCrowell) +0  ЄlikeCrowell,courtreviewofCFTCorderswithrespecttofactandlaw   Єunlikebankruptcy,doesntexercise allordinarypowersofdstcrts(156)BUTITISABOUTaprivaterightcoreofArt.IIIcrtsbutlabelisnt talismanic:publicright/privaterightnotdeterminative,BUTjustbalancingofrisksofencroachment,etc.Checkforseparationofpowersrisksnonehere.DISSENTBRENNAN:formalistbalancingdangerous;slipperyslope;waiverirrelevant;structural/individualinterestsofArt.IIIare inseparable(157).VERM:workableruleinquireintoCongressreasonsfornonArt.III  mechanism.Plausible?Thenokay.LookatdetailsofschemetoseewhetherCongressreasoniscredible:aggrandizement?takingawayfromjudges?andREMEMBER:maincompetitorsareCongressandExecutiveCongressoftenusesjudiciarytomonitorwhetherexeccomplyingwithlaw;willoftenWANTjudiciarytoadjudicate.WhenadjudicativepowerinExec,isenhancingexec _d  power,itsprinciplecompetitor.Sowillbecareful.UsuallyCongressjustificationsarequiteplausible.Thisisrelaxed,functionalapproach.VERM:SchorembodiescurrentlawaboutArt.IIIquestion:pragmaticapproach, x}# onstatutebystatutebasis5b   ' 5b0    DidCongresshaveagood/rationalpolicyreasontocommitdecisions % toadminagencyforinitialdecision?5b݌ (#(# Ќ  5b   '   5b0   factorstoconsider:expertise,savingsoflitigationcosts,etc. F K' (Schor)5b0݌ ( (# (# Ќ  5b   ' 5b0    DoesthatposemajorthreattocorefunctionofAct.IIIcourts?5b+݌!)(#(# Ќ  5b   '   5bܵ0   factors(Crowell)threattojudicialindependence5bܵ݌a"f* (# (# Ќ  5b   '    5b0 "   themorereviewofagencydecisioninlaterArt.III #+ proceedings,thelessthreat5b݌ " (#" (# Ќ  5b   '    5bƷ0 "   whereareaisspecializedandmarginal,asinSchor5bƷ݌|$-" (#" (# Ќ  5b   '    5b0 "   ormajorchunkofArt.IIIjurisdiction5b݌1%6 ." (#" (# Ќ  5b   ' 5b0    Inmostcases,courtsthingCongressdiditokayspecialized, % / marginal,nontraditional,etc.5b݌ (#(# Ќ  5b   ' 5b0    IncentivesforCongresstogetitright5b݌J'O"1(#(# Ќ  5b   '   5bH0   competitionwithPresidentuseArt.IIIcourtstomonitor '#2 executivebehavior5bH{݌  (# (# Ќ  5b   ' 5bF0    IfanswersareYes,NothenCongresscandoit,andlookatfactors5bFm݌c)h$4(#(# Ќ  5b   '   5b!0   5b!T݌*%5 (# (# Ќ   )N    '    )NŽ 6  .0   Thomasv.UnionCarbideAgProducts,473U.S.568(1984) )NŽ ی*%6 (# (# Ќ  ݀(157)(unanimous)HELDconstitutionalastatutedelegatingtoEPAtoadjudicatecontroversiesamongpesticidemakersabouthowmuchcompensation 1,6'8 forinformationoneshouldpayanother.BRENNAN(formalist):righthereisprivaterightcreatedbyCongressionalstatuteneedforschemeanddegreeofjudicialsupervisionmadeitokayOCONNOR:functionalanalysisthedelegationisconstitutionalintegratedintobroaderregulatoryscheme )N   '    )N 7  .0   Simpsonv.OfficeofThriftSupervision󀄀9thCir.1994: )N یz (# (# Ќ  upholdingagencypowertoadjudicateadisputeinwhichitcompelledanofficerofanS&LtopayrestitutiontoS&L;okaybecauseprovidedformeaningfuljudicialreview,andthriftregstatutecreatespublicrights. )N   '    )N 8  .0   NoriegaPerezv.U.S.(9thcir.1999)(158:underSchor,agency )N یH M  (# (# Ќ  mayadjudicateacivildisputeinvolvingdocumentfraud,emphasizingthatArt.IIIcrtsretainabilitytoreviewresults,rightsinvolvedwerepublicrights,assignmentstoagenciespromotedleggoaloincreasingefficiency,onlynarrowclassofdisputesassignedtotheagency )N   '    )N 9  .0   GulfPowerCo.v.U.S.(11thCir.1999)agencymaydetermine )N!  ی  (# (# Ќ  howmuchcompensationisduesomeonewhosepropwastakeninviolationofFifthAmendment,becauseArt.IIIcrtcouldreviewthedecision. )N   '    )N 10  .0   NgFungHov.White(1922)(159)inhabeasproceedingsto )N  ی  (# (# Ќ  testvalidityofadeportationorder,thepetitionerwasentitledtoadenovojudicialtrialonaclaimofcitizenship;admindenialofclaimofcitizenshipwastherefore adenialofanessentialjurisdictionalfact.(Brandeis)̄todeportonewho claimstobeacitizenobviouslydepriveshimofliberty..(160);involvesConstitutinalclaim(noexactlypublicorprivateright). )N   '    )N> 11  .0   OhioWaterValleyv.BenAvonBorough(1920)Supreme )N>q  ی (# (# Ќ  Courtenunciatesconstitutionalfactdoctrine:dueprocessclauserequiredafulljudicialtrialwenautilityraisedaclaimofconfiscationcrtmustdeterminebothlawandfactonitsownindependentjudgment,andpriorhearingsareseemingfornaught.influentialcase(160) )N   '    )Ni 12  .0   CasesinwhichSCdoesntseemtowanttodefertoadmin )Ni  یLQ (# (# Ќ  agencies,buttosubstituteitsownindependentjudgmentastofacts:libelofpublicfigures,obscenity,admissibilityofvoluntaryconfessions.See,eg.,Ashcraftv.Tenn(1944). ej   ' VERM:re:constitutionalfact/jurisdictionalfactquestion:5b  5b0 '   constitutionalfact:existenceofwhichisprerequisiteforCongressional # exerciseofpowers(e.g.,whethersomethingmovesininterstatecommerce)5b݌ '(#'(# Ќ  5b  5b0 '   jurisdictionalfact:evenmoreobscurewewontworryaboutthis5b݌%'(#'(# Ќ    +   ' +ֱJ  .0    TheSeventhAmendmentasaLimitationontheAgencysPowerto  ( Adjudicate (161) [   +ֱ ی!)(#(# Ќ   '    )N   '    )N" 1  .0   Jones&LaughlinSteel:1937)(161):re:righttotrial7th )N"U ی0#5+ (# (# Ќ  Amendment:righttotrialdoesntnotapplywheretheproceedingisnotinthenatureofasuitatcommonlawhereisstatutoryproceeding;case standsforthepropositionthatthe7aisgenerallyinapplicableinadminproceedings,wherejurytrialswouldbeincompatiblewiththewholeconceptofadministrativeadjudicationandwouldsubstantiallyinterferewiththeNLRBsroleinthestatutoryscheme....Butwhencongressprovidesfortheenforcementofstatutoryrightsinanordinarycivilactioninthedistrictcrts,wherethereisobviouslynofunctionaljustificationfordenyingthejurytrialright,ajurytrialmustbeavailableiftheactioninvolvesrightsandremediesofthesorttypicallyenforceinanactionatlaw.(162) )N   '    )N8 2  .0   Curtisv.Loether(1974)7arequiresjurytrialinactionfor )N8k ی*%6 (# (# Ќ  moneydamagesunderCivilRightsAct amendmentdoesapplytoactionsenforcingstatutoryrightsandrequiresajurytrialondemand,ifthestatute K,P'8 createslegalrightsandremedies,enforceableinanactionfordamagesintheordinarycourtsoflaw. )N   '    )Nk 3  .0   AtlasRoofingv.OSHReviewComm(1977)(162)rejects7a )Nk یaf (# (# Ќ  defensetoadminimpositionofmonetarypenaltiesforregviolations:publicright,factfindingandinitialadjudicationtoadminforumwithwhichjurywouldbeincompatiblewhereenforcingpublicrights )N   '    )NM 4  .0   Granfinancierav.Nordberg(1989):preferenceclaimin )NM ی/ 4 (# (# Ќ  Q% X' " [X X'" [XQbankruptcyislegalinnature,andtorequirejurytrialwouldnotgofartodismantleCongressspecialbankruptcystatutoryscheme.sotrialbyjuryrequiredhere.BRENNAN:Returnstopublicprivatescheme: ' GOTHROUGHCAREFULLYTOPOF163languagēforstatutoryrights:mustbecloselyintertwinedwithfedregprogramthatCongresshaspowertoenact;ifrightneitherbelongstonorexistsagainstthefedgovernment,thenmustbeadjudicatedbyArt.IIIcrt;ifrightislegalinnature,then7aapplies.   SCALIACONCURS:(163):publicrightsmeansrightsOFthepublic,thatis,pertainingtoclaimsbroughtbyoragainsttheU.S. II.0 ' SCOPEOFREVIEWHM '(#'(#  NOTE: APAisdefault,butorganicstatutesmayestablishotherstandardsof   review +   ' ++A  .0    APA706.ScopeofReview (1198)++RیDI(#(# Ќ   ' Totheextentnecessarytodecisionandwhenpresented,thereviewingcourtshalldecideallrelevantquestionsoflaw,interpretconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisions,anddeterminethemeaningorapplicabilityofthetermsofanagencyaction.Thereviewingcourtshall ' (1)0  compelagencyactionunlawfullywithheldorunreasonabledelayed;and(#(#  ' (2)0  holdunlawfulandsetasideagencyaction,findings,andconclusions  foundtobe (#(#  '    (A)0 arbitrary,capricious,anabuseofdiscretion,or  otherwisenotinaccordancewithlaw;  (# (#  '    (B)0 contrarytoconstitutionalright,power,privilege,or NS! immunity;  (# (#  '    (C)0 inexcessofstatutoryjurisdiction,authority,or # limitations,orshortofstatutoryright;  (# (#  '    (D)0 withoutobservanceofprocedurerequiredbylaw;% (# (#  '    (E)0 unsupportedbysubstantialevidenceinacasesubjectto & 556and557ofthistitleorotherwisereviewedontherecordofanagencyhearingprovidedbystatute;or  (# (#  '    (F)0 unwarrantedbythefactstotheextentthatthefactsare !) subjecttotrialdenovobythereviewingcourt.  (# (# Inmakingtheforegoingdeterminations,thecourt shallreviewthewhole L#Q+ recordorthosepartsofitcitedbyaparty ,anddueaccountshallbetaken  $, oftheruleofprejudicialerror.5b  5b0 '   V:Courtsdecideallrelevantquestionsoflaw(Crowell);reviewfacts 0&5!/ deference?5b